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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo--EFFIE HOBBS,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 16217

EDWARD T. WEHNER and
JEAN \'JEHNER, his wife,
Defendants/Appellants.
---oooOooo--BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a mechanic's lien foreclosure and breach
of contract action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendants the sum of $50,950, expended
by her in labor, materials and furnishings toward the
remodeling and expansion oi.: the defendants' residence
for which project she acted as their contractor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This action was tried to the Court.

The Hon.

John F. Wahlquist entered judgment for the plaintiff
and against the defendants for the principal sum of
$33,360, together with prejudgment interest and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment and
judgment in their favor as a matter of law or, that
failing, a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Statement of Facts is presented within
those rules of laws requiring the defendants to state
the facts consistent with the Findings of Fact entered
by the Court and favorable to the plaintiff.

This

Statement of Facts is drafted no broader than necessary
to fairly present the fact pattern necessary by the
defendants to support the legal issues on aopeal in
this action.
Plaintiff is an Idaho State resident.

(Tr. at 1).

Her husband died on July 6, 1974, leaving her an inheritance in excess of $500,000.

(Tr. at 3).

An Idaho

building contractor named Ed Goble approached her during
early 1975 to associate with her in the building construction business.

(Tr. at 64).

formed the Hobb's Construction

Plaintiff thereafter

Com~any

and commenced

business in the State of Idaho during March, 1975.
(Tr. at 2, 61).

This company was individually owned by

plaintiff as a sole proprietorship with r,oble designated
as an employee.

(Tr. at 65-66).

The olaintiff function-

ed within the business as a "financing contractor",
i.e., -she provided favorable interest rate financing
for homes built by her construction company.

(Tr. at 67).

Goble's responsibility was to conduct and suoervise the
company's construction projects, i.e. - the oreoaration
and submission of a project bid to the client, on-site
supervision, the selection of subcontractors and the
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coordination of their efforts, the purchase of materials
and the hiring and firing of employees.

(Tr. at 65, 67).

Plaintiff and Goble maintained their business association
for the balance of 1975 through home construction
in Idaho.

(Tr. at 68-69).

pr~ects

None of the plaintiff's home

construction activities required an Idaho contractor's
license because Idaho law does not require the state
licensing of those who build within the private sector.
(Tr. at 66).
The defendants have owned and lived in a small
home in Ogden, Utah for the past several years.

(Tr. at 66).

The defendant, Jean Wehner, is the plaintiff's natural
sister.

(Tr. at 2).

The plaintiff and the defendant,

Jean lvehner, likewise have a brother, Ronald Brower, who
with his wife live in Ogden, Utah.

(Tr. at 184).

Negotiations among these family members began in the Fall
of 1975 for the plaintiff to remodel and construct an
addition to the defendants' home and to build in Oqden a
new. home for the Brewers'.

(Tr. at 4, 69-71, 185).

These

negotiations were concurrent with the plaintiff's undertaking to build another home in the Ogden area for a
person named Allan Jackson, not related to the plaintiff.
(Tr. at 69).

The negotiations with the defendants

resul~

in Ed Goble's preparation of rough draft nlans for the
remodeling and the addition to defendants' home seen by
plaintiff and final design and specification plans not seen
by her.

(Tr. at 5-6, 71-73, 75, 80, 83, 233).

These olans
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......,

and specifications were thereafter used by Goble to
solicit and obtain competitive bids from subcontractors
to allow plaintiff to present defendants with an overall
cost bid for the project.

(Tr. at 75-80, 83).

This

procedure produced from Goble a written bid proposal to
defendants of $18,000.

(Tr. at 87-89, 91).

This bid

contemplated a furnished home computed upon standard
construction costs of $7 a square foot for garage construction and $20 a square foot for single floor construction with the further provision that the defendants
would do a portion of the labor.

(Tr. at 90, 240-242).

The plaintiff saw the written $18,000, bid proposal but
did not participate with Goble in his solicitation of
bids from subcontractors nor did she receive from Goble
all of the bids so solicited.

(Tr. at 78-79, 87, 234).

Through Goble, the plaintiff similarlv submitted
a $40,000, bid to the
posed new home.

Brower~

to construct their pro-

(Tr. at 203-205).

Both the defendants and the Brewers elected to
go forward on the basis of plaintiff's bid and to utilize
p1aintiff as their contractor.

(Tr. at 4-5, 7, 185,

203-204).
The plaintiff's agreement with derendants orovided that construction within the $18,000, bid would
be done entirelv at plaintiff's cost.

(Tr. at 6, 92).

Plaintiff was to receive no corrJnission derived from a
?ercentage or cost-plus

for~ula

nor would she receive
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a mark-up from purchased materials, fixtures and furnishings.

(Tr. at 6, 92).

All materials and supplies

for the project would be acquired through, and in the
name of, the Hobb's Construction Company.
(Tr. at 227-229).

Similarly, all billings and invoices

would be received by the plaintiff directly from the
materialmen and suppliers and paid by plaintiff upon
the business checking account of the Hobb's
Company.

Cons~

(Plt's exhts. 2-23, 25-46; Tr. at 5, 227-229).

Lastly, plaintiff would furnish and carry the financing of the cost of the construction at an annual
finance charge of 8% through either a real property
mortgage or trust deed.

(Tr. at 68, 93, 154, 156).

This interest rate was less than that available through
financial instutions and would be not invoked by
plaintiff until the completion

of construction.

(Tr. at 92-93, 212).
The same contractual arrangement was concluded
between the plaintiff and the Brewers with a comparable
finance charge established for the real property
mortgage or trust deed to be provided and carried by
plaintiff.

(Tr. at 20, 69, 203, 212-213, 215, 227-228).

v<ork on the defendants' home commenced with the
acquisition of an Ogden City Building Permit, which
permit was paid by plaintiff through the construction
company name.

(Tr. at 7, 97, 107).
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Plaintiff completed the remodeling and addition
work to the defendants' home during the last part of
June, 1976, at which time the defendants resumed
occupancy of their home.

(Tr. 162).

The total cost of

construction was approximately $47,000,

(Tr. at 99-100).

The Brewers' horne was similarly started and completed
within this same time frame.

(Tr. at 185, 210, 227-228).

Both the defendants' home and the Brewers' home were
undertaken and completed by plaintiff pursuant to
agreement in that all work was

su~ervised

on-site by

Ed Goble or one of plaintiff's other employees; all
subcontractors were obtained and their work scheduled
by plaintiff's employees; all materials and supplies
were obtained at contractor's prices through the Hobb's
Construction Company name, and all materialmen and
supplier billings were received directly by plaintiff
and paid by her through the Hobb's Construction
Company.

(Plt's exhts. 2-23, 25-46; Tr. at 6-53, 212,

215, 227-229).

Defendants refused responsibility for

the approximate $47,000, construction amount following
which the plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien against
the real property.

(Tr. at 59, 14 3-144) .

Plaintiff has never acquired nor held a Utah
State Contractor's License.

(Tr. at 55, 58).

She

was personally aware from the outset of Utah construction activities that

t~e

work to be done bv her

on the defendants' home and the Rrowers'

ho~e

rcouired
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.
Plaintiff did not make personal inquiry or application
for such a license but rather relied upon the expertise
and representations of her employee, Ed Goble, that he
would procure a license or otherwise insure plaintiff's
oorrpliance with Utah law.

(Tr. at 56-58, 94-95).

Goble subsequently informed her that the arrangements
had been made for the Hobb's Construction Company to
proceed under the Utah State Contractor's License
possessed by Allen Buxton, doing business as Personalized Builders.

(Tr. at 56-58).

Plaintiff accordingly

relied upon Goble's representations without further
inquiry and allowed work to commence on the defendants'
home and that of the Browers'.

(Tr. at 57) •

Allen Buxton

was a subcontractor obtained by Hobb's Construction
Company through Ed Goble to do certain framing and
preliminary work on the defendants' home.

(Tr. at 58-59).

Plaintiff was subsequently advised by Mr. Buxton that
no one within plaintiff's employ had approached him
with the request that the plaintiff's construction
company be allowed to work under his Utah Contractor's
License.

(Tr. at 95-96).

The olaintiff never made

personal inquiry whether Utah law was violated through
the attempted or actual "assignment" of a Utah
Contractor's License.

(Tr. at 95).
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ARr.UMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A l.o!ATTER OF LAW
BY AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF
WHERE THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE DEMONS~
THAT PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS
OF CONTRACTING AND ACTED IN THE CAPACITY
OF A CONTRACTOR WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A L~AH
CONTRACTOR'S LICENSE

Defendants contend that the trial court erred as
a matter of law by allowing the plaintiff to enforce her
building contract against them when the evidence demonstrated, without contradiction, that the plaintiff
never possessed a Utah Contractor's License, notwithstanding that she conducted business in the State of
Utah as a contractor and notwithstanding that she
functioned as defendants' contractor in the
and construction done to their home.

re~odeling

(Findings of

Fact, ,110).
The Court allowed the plaintiff to recover on
her building contract with the defendants upon the
following two Conclusions of Law:
a.

the plaintiff acted in good faith reliance

that she did have available to her a valid Utah Contractor's License.
b.

(Conclusions of Law,

~:la).

the plaintiff was not a statutory contractor

because her contracting relationship with defendants
was undertaken benevolently, all construction was done
at plaintiff's cost with no gain to her, and that the
income to be derived by plaintiff from financing the
cost of construction was comnutcd unon an interest rate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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substantially below that offered through financial
institutions.

(Conclusions of Law, Ub).

Defendants submit that the foregoing Conelusions of Law entered by the trial judge are
contrary to Utah law and constitute reversible
error.
UCA §58-23-1 (1953) provides in relevant
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm,
co-partnership, corporation, association,
or other organization, or any combination
of any thereof, to engage in the business
or act in the capacity of contractor within this state without having a license
therefore as herein provided, unless such
person, firm, co-partnership, corporation,
association, or other organization is
particularly exempted as provided in this
act. Evidence of the securing of any
construction or building permit from a
governmental agency, or the employment of
any person on a construction project, or
the offering of any bid to do the work of
a contractor as herein defined, shall be
accepted in any court of the state of
Utah as prima facie evidence of engaging
in the business or acting in the capacity
of a contractor.
In Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P2d 733 (1948),
this Court applied the language within
UCA §58-23-1 (1953), as follows:
The authorities are fairly uniform to
the effect that failure to obtain a license
which is required by a statute enacted
solely for revenue ourposes does not render
contracts made by the offending party void.
On the other hand, contracts made by an
unlicensed contractor in violation of a
statute passed for the protection of the
public arc held to be void and unenforceable.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Our statute is so worded as to indicate a
legislative intent to protect the citizen
from irresponsible contractors. The
statute, while not comprehensive, provides
for a small license fee.
Control over the
contractor is given to the Department of
Registration. Upon an appro~riate hearing,
the Department may, for unprofessional
conduct, suspend or cancel the license.
Good reputation and integrity are essential
to obtaining a license and the entire
object of the statute is protection of the
public against fraudulent and illegal
practice, which have always been recognized as a distinct characteristic of
statutes, which are not mere revenue
measures. The statute being enacted for
the protection of the public, plaintiff's
written contract is void unless it is
competent and permissible for him to
establish that the date when it was
actually executed and delivered was later
than the date of execution shown in the
contract.
200 P2d at 736-737.
Thereafter, in t-1oslev v. Johnson,
22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P2d 149 (1969)., this Court construed
the provisions within UCA §73-3-22, 25

(1953), which

require well drillers to secure and maintain an annual
permit.

This Court found the statute to be regulatory

and designed for the public's protection and accordingly
held that the plaintiff's failure to secure a drilling
permit rendered his contract with the defendant void
and unenforceable.

453 P2d at 150.

The Court expressly

reaffirmed its holding in Olsen v. Reese,
114 Utah 411, 200 P2d 733

(1948), and further denied the

plaintiff recovery under the theorv of quantum meruit,
as follows:
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We are asked to
of Olsen v. Reese, but
for the reason that we
decision therein given

overrule the case~
we decline to do ~b
are convinced the
is sound.

In the Olsen case supra, this
court did not pass on the question of
whether or not the contractor could have
recovered upon the theory of quantum
meruit.
We are unable to see why this
plaintiff, whose contract is void, should
be able to recover on the theory of
quantum meruit.
To permit him to do so
would permit him to evade the law and
recover for work which he is forbidden
to pursue.
If he got the reasonable
value of his services, he might even
prove more than his contract would have
given him had it been valid.
453 P2d at 151.
The Utah Supreme Court was once again asked to
overrule Olsen v. Reese , supra, in Meridian Corp. v.
HcGlynn/Garmaker Company, 567 P2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
Before the Court was whether a contractor licensed in
another state could recover on his construction contract
in the state of Utah where he had no Utah license.

The

Court concluded that plaintiff was a statutory contractor and denied him recovery.

The holding provided in

relevant part:
The Plaintiff in this case is aware
of our clear prior holdings; however,
he urges us to overrule the case of
Olsen v. Reese (citations omitted).
This we refuse to do.
We think the
case was procerly decided, and we
confirmed the principles of law therein
stated to be the law of this state.
567 P2d at llll.
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UCA 58-23-3(3) defines a statutory contractor
~

for whom state licensing is required with the following
language:
3. Contractor: Any person, firm,
co-partnership, corporation, association
or other organization, or any combination
of any thereof, who for a fixed sum,
price, fee, percentage or other compensation other than wages, undertakes with
another for the construction, alteration,
repair, addition to or improvement of any
building, highway, road, railroad, excavation or other structure, project,
development or improvement, other than to
personalty, or any part thereof; provided,
that the term contractor, as used in this
act, shall include anyone who builds more
than one structure on his own property
during any one year for the purpose of
sale and shall include subcontractor, but
shall not include anyone who merely
furnishes materials or supplies without
fabricating the same into, or consuming
the same in the performance of the work
of the contractors as herein defined.
The term contractor shall also include
any person who by advertising, or otherwise, holds himself out as a contractor,
but shall not include persons regularly
engaged as maintenance personnel to do
such repairs, remodeling, etc. as are
casual, isolated or incidental in their
nature.
The language within UCA §58-23-1 and
UCA § 58-23-3(3), makes no provision for
"good faith" noncompliance.

so-called

Similarly, the decisions

of this Court have never provided for a "good faith''
noncompliance argument.

The cited statutes make

mandatory that a person engaged in

t~e

business of

contracting or acting in the canacity of a contractor
comply fully with the law.

The necessity for full

compliance is underscored bv the provisions of
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,,.

r:. >:~l

UCA §58-23-18, which impose criminal misdemeanor sanctions

r;,..
upon an entity acting in the capacity of a contractor
w_ithout a license.

A "good faith" defense of the type

imposed by the trial court in this action would
necessarily void the regulatory powers of the Utah State
Department of Business Regulations and frustrate the
objectives underlying the licensing requirements set
forth within UCA §58-23-1 et. sec.

The trial court's

use of a "good faith" defense to allow the plaintiff to
recover on her contract is particularly suspect in this
action where the evidence is uncontradicted that the
plaintiff knew that her Utah construction activities
would require a Utah contractor's license but where no
personal effort was thereafter expended by her to effect
compliance.

(Tr. at 56-58, 94-95).

Plaintiff's conduct

as a matter of law cannot establish good faith where she
relies merely upon the representations of one of her
employees and even then failed to inquire further as to
their accuracy.

(Tr. at 57-59, 95-96).

Plaintiff's

decision to enter the business of contracting and to
act in the capacity of a contractor obligates her to
discover and know the law of any jurisdiction into which
she ventures.

The same standard of inquiry and com-

pliance is applicable to her as to any other contractor
within the industry

irres~ective

of size or business

expertise and acumen.
The trial court, independently of the "good
faith" noncompliance issue, found that the plaintiff was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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UCA SSS-23-1 and UCA SSS-23-3(3).

The Court con-

eluded, as a matter of law, that the building
contract between plaintiff and defendant was
benevolently made and not the typical type of
building contract made between a builder and
property owner designed to produce income
profit to the builder.

or

(Conclusions of Law, ,llb).

This Conclusion of Law ignores the legal standard
for defining a contractor within UCA § 58-2-3(3),
and the basis of the bargain between the parties.
UCA §58-23-3(3), makes clear that financial
renumeration, gain, or profit is not a requisite
necessary to impose statutory contractor status
upon the plaintiff.

This statute unequivocably

provides that".

The term contractor shall also

.

include any person who by advertising, or otherwise, holds himself out as a contractor, . . . "
This legal standard

i~poses

statutory contractor

status upon the plaintiff independently of considerations of whether or not she derived financial
gain or renumeration from the building contract she
negotiated with the defendants.

The record in this

action is uncontradicted that the plaintiff held
herself out as the defendants' contractor through
the solicitation of bids fran materialmen and
buyers, her use of her construction connanv name tn
obtain a contractor's discount for all materials

a~d

supplies purchased for the defenda~ts' home, the use
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of the construction company name to directly receive
~¥-

all bills and invoices from materialmen and suppliers
obtained and used by plaintiff for the construction
to the defendants' horne, and the exclusive use of the
construction company checking account to pay such
billings and invoices.
212, 215, 227-229).

(Plt's exhts. 2-23, 25-46;

This form of business organization

and operation was not limited to the defendants'
project but was similarly utilized by plaintiff in
obtaining the contract for, and the building of, the
Browers' horne.
227-228).

(Tr. at 20, 69, 203, 212-213, 215,

Further persuasive, is that the plaintiff

had concurrently undertaken the construction of a
third home in the Ogden, Utah area for one
Allan Jackson and that this individual was unrelated
to plaintiff.

(Tr. at 69}.

Each of these Ogden, Utah

building projects required the plaintiff's employment
of laborers independently of those within the eMploy
of subcontractors obtained by her.

(Tr. at 51-52).

The Memorandum Decision of the court and its Findings
of Fact independently demonstrate ample evidence of
the manner in which the

~laintiff

conducted business

and held herself out as a contractor within the
statutory definition of UCA §58-23-1 and
UCA §58-23-3(3}.
Without regard to the language within
~C~

§SB-23-3(3), which defines a contractor within
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standards going beyond the presence or absence of
·.~

financial gain or other compensation, the court
erred when it concluded that the plaintiff was not
a statutory contractor on the premise that the
building contract at issue was a benevolent act
and not the typical type of contractual arrangement
designed to produce income or profit.

This

conclusion ignores the very broad ".

. fixed

sum, price, fee, percentage or other compensation
other than wages, •

." language within

UCA §58-23-3, which serves to make one a contractor.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this
action establish without contradiction that the
plaintiff's building contract with the defendant
was negotiated by the plaintiff to be income
producing.
The basis of the bargain between the parties
clearly contemplated that the plaintiff was to derive
her profit from financing at 8% per annum the actual
cost of the construction to the defendants' home.
(Tr. at 68-69).

The plaintiff intended this

arrangement to be income profit producing.

(Tr.

at 92-93;

Findings of Fact, '12; Conclusions of Law, 1ilb). Upo'1
cross-examination from defendants' counsel at trial,
the plaintiff testified as follows:
Q.

c!O\v, Wh•2n the thing -.·as f'Ut tocether,

then of course vou were to finance the
thine Llnd also to ch:1rc;e t>·p, intore~t,
then,

ett

~ic"' 1 Lt.

p2rcent on ··our rtonc",

isLibrary.
tl1:1t
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A.

On the mortgage. I made absolutely
no profit on the building.
-~
Tr. at 92.

Q.

All right. Then as a result of getting
involved in this thing, you were going
to pick up the mortgage on their house
and earn yourself eight percent on the
mortgage, is that correct?

A.

On the mortgage. That is why I done it
at that cost, so it wouldn't cost them
so much.

Q.

You were making your profit on the
interest you would be receiving on the
cost of construction?

A.

That is true.
Tr. at 228.

The terms of the building contract negotiated
between plaintiff and defendant were not unique to these
parties.

This same form of construction and financing

arrangement was negotiated between the plaintiff and the
Brewers at a comparable finance charge rate.
69, 203, 212-213, 215, 227-228).

(Tr. at 20,

An essential basis of

the bargain for both the contract negotiated between the
plaintiff and the defendants and between the

plaintif~

and the Brewers was that the plaintiff would undertake
and complete the construction with no profit to her in
consideration for providing financing at an agreed upon
finance charge for the cost of construction accrued under
each contract.

(Tr. at 156, 203, 212, 236).

The

essential role which the plaintiff's financinq function
played within

th~

building contract negotiated between

the parties is further amplified by the plaintiff's
e:-:pL>nation
ofQuinney
theLawrrovision
theby the
r1echanic'
s and
lien
Sponsored by the S.J.
Library. Funding for within
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filed by her against the defendants' property

,,.

providing for payment by the defendant upon completion of the improvements.

Defendants' counsel

asked plaintiff for an explanation of this
provision and the following testimony was solicited
at page 236 of the transcript:
A.

It means that there would have been
a contract drawn for me to carry a
second mortgage on the home.

Q.

You didn't expect a cash payment of
any kind on the completion of this
contract at all, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

You knew that there would be extended
payments over a period of time.

A.

Yes.

Q.

There would be a contract in that
regard that provided for payment.
Is that so?

A.

Correct.

Relevant to this action, is that the financing
arrangements concluded by plaintiff within the
defendants' building contract and the Brewers' building contract were not unique and isolated transactions
for the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's uncontradicted

testimony is that she organized the Hobb's Construction
Company so that she could function as a financing
contractor and that she in
capacit~

~act

functioned in this

within the Idaho home building industrv for the

eleven month period prior to concludinn her building
contract with

de~cndants.

( '.:'r.

CJ

t

G7) .

Dcfcr:du.nts do
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the plaintiff which otherwise would not have been
afforded them but for the family ties between
plaintiff and the defendant, Jean Wehner.

rN.
~he

Family

ties, however, were not sufficient to remove all
of the plaintiff's profit making mechanisms as a
building contractor.

The defendants submit that

their building contract was negotiated within the
same foremat that the plaintiff had conducted her
business for the past year in the state of Idaho
as a financing contractor under the name of the
Hobb's Construction Company.
CONCLUSION
Defendants conclude that both Utah statutory
and case law authority make the plaintiff a
"contractor" within the meaning of UCA §58-23-1 and
UCA §58-23-3(3).

Plaintiff never possessed a Utah

State Contractor's License any time material to this
action.

The holdings of this Court make her building

contract with the defendants void and unenforceable.
The trial court accordingly heard as a matter of law
by allowing the plaintiff to recover on this building
contract against the defendant.
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